In this chapter, we study the MOR cryptosystem with symplectic and orthogonal groups over finite fields of odd characteristics. There are four infinite families of finite classical Chevalley groups. These are special linear groups SL(d, q), orthogonal groups O(d, q), and symplectic groups Sp(d, q). The family O(d, q) splits into two different families of Chevalley groups depending on the parity of d. The MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) was studied by the second author. In that case, the hardness of the MOR cryptosystem was found to be equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in F q d . In this chapter, we show that the MOR cryptosystem over Sp(d, q) has the security of the discrete logarithm problem in F q d . However, it seems likely that the security of the MOR cryptosystem for the family of orthogonal groups is F q d 2 . We also develop an analog of row-column operations in symplectic and orthogonal groups which is of independent interest as an appendix.
Introduction
Public-key cryptography is the backbone of this modern society. However with recent advances in quantum computers and its possible implication to factoring integers and solving the discrete logarithm problems, it seems that we are left with no secure cryptographic primitive. So it seems prudent that we set out in search for new cryptographic primitives and subsequently new cryptosystems. The obvious question is: how to search and where to look? One can look into several well-known hard problems in Mathematics and hope to create a trap-door function, or one can try to generalize the known, trusted cryptosystems.
This chapter is in the direction of generalizing a known cryptosystem with the hope that something practical and useful will come out of this generalization. A new but arbitrary cryptosystem might not be considered by the community as a secure cryptosystem for decades. So our approach is conservative but practical. Several such approaches were earlier made by many eminent mathematicians. To name a few, Maze et al. [1, 2] developed SAP and Shpilrain and Zapata developed CAKE, both work in non-abelian structures. There is an interesting cryptosystem in the work of Climent et al. [3] . We further recommend the work of Grogoriev et al. [4] and Roman'kov [5] .
The cryptosystem that we have in mind is the MOR cryptosystem [6] [7] [8] [9] . In Section 2, we describe the MOR cryptosystem in details. It is a simple but powerful generalization of the well-known and classic ElGamal cryptosystem. In this cryptosystem, the discrete logarithm problem works in the automorphism group of a group instead of the group. As a matter of fact, it can work in the automorphism group of most algebraic structures. However, we will limit ourselves to finite groups. One way to look at the MOR cryptosystem is that it generalizes the discrete logarithm problem from a cyclic (sub)group to an arbitrary group.
The MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) was studied earlier [6] and cryptanalyzed by Monico [10] . It became clear that working with matrix groups of size d over F q and with automorphisms that act by conjugation, like the inner automorphisms, there are two possible reductions of the security to finite fields. It is the security of the discrete logarithm problem in F q d or F q d 2 ([6] , Section 7). This reduction is similar to the embedding of the discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points of an elliptic curve to a finite field; the degree of the extension of that field over the field of definition of the elliptic curve is called the embedding degree. In the case of SL(d, q), it became the security of F q d . The reason that we undertook this study is to see if the security in other classical Chevalley groups is F q d or F q d 2 .
In cryptography, it is often hard to come up with theorems about security of a cryptosystem. However, at this moment it seems likely that the security of the MOR cryptosystem in orthogonal groups O(d, q)isF q d 2 . The way we implement this cryptosystem is by solving the word problem in generators. It presents no advantage to small characteristic. In the light of Joux's [11] improvement of the index-calculus attack in small characteristic, this contribution of the MOR cryptosystem is remarkable.
In summary, the proposed MOR cryptosystem is totally different from the known ElGamal cryptosystems from a functional point of view. Its implementation depends on Gaussian elimination and substitutions (substituting a matrix for a word in generators). However, we do have a concrete and tangible understanding of its security. It is clear from this work that the MOR cryptosystem over classical groups is not quantum-secure. However, for other groups like solvable groups, the answer is not known and could be a topic of further research.
Structure of the chapter
This chapter is an interplay between computational group theory and public-key cryptography, in particular the MOR cryptosystem, and is thus interdisciplinary in nature. In this chapter, we study the MOR cryptosystem using the orthogonal and symplectic groups over finite fields of odd characteristic.
In Section 2, we describe the MOR cryptosystem in some details. We emphasize that the MOR cryptosystem is a natural generalization of the classic ElGamal cryptosystem. In Section 3, we describe the orthogonal and symplectic groups and their automorphisms. In Appendix A, we describe few new algorithms. These algorithms use row-column operations to write an element in classical groups as a word in generators. This is very similar to the Gaussian elimination algorithm for special linear groups. These algorithms are vital to the implementation of the MOR Modern Cryptography -Theory, Technology, Adaptation and Integration cryptosystem. These algorithms are also of independent interest in computational group theory.
Notations and terminology
It was bit hard for us to pick notations for this chapter. The notations used by a Lie group theorist is somewhat different from that of a computational group theorist. We tried to preserve the essence of notations as much as possible. For example, a Lie group theorist will use SL lþ1 q ðÞto denote what we will denote by SL l þ 1; q ðÞ or SL d; q ðÞ . We have used T X to denote the transpose of the matrix X. This was necessary to avoid any confusion that might arise when using X À1 and T X simultaneously. In this chapter, we use K and F q interchangeably, while each of them is a finite field of odd characteristic. However, in the appendix the field k is unrestricted. The matrix te ij is used to denote the matrix unit with t in the i; j ðÞ th place and zero everywhere else. We will often use x r t ðÞas generators, a notation used in the theory of Chevalley groups. Here r is a short hand for i; j ðÞ and x r t ðÞare defined in Tables A1, A3 , A5, and A7. We often refer to the orthogonal group as O d; q ðÞ , specifically, the split orthogonal group as O þ 2l; q ðÞ or O þ 2l þ 1; q ðÞ and the twisted orthogonal group as O À 2l; q ðÞ . All other notations used are standard.
The MOR cryptosystem
The MOR cryptosystem is a natural generalization of the classic ElGamal cryptosystem. It was first proposed by Paeng et al. [9] . To elaborate the idea behind a MOR cryptosystem, we take a slightly expository route. For the purpose of this exposition, we define the discrete logarithm problem. It is one of the most common cryptographic primitive in use. It works in any cyclic (sub)group G ¼ g hi but is not secure in any cyclic group. Definition 2.1 (The discrete logarithm problem). The discrete logarithm problem in G ¼ g hi , given g and g m , find m. The word "find" in the above definition is bit vague, in this chapter we mean compute m. The hardness to solve the discrete logarithm problem depends on the presentation of the group and is not an invariant under isomorphism. It is believed that the discrete logarithm problem is secure in the multiplicative group of a finite field and the group of rational points of an elliptic curve.
A more important cryptographic primitive, related to the discrete logarithm problem, is the Diffie-Hellman problem, also known as the computational DiffieHellman problem. Definition 2.2 (Diffie-Hellman problem). Given g, g m 1 , and g m 2 , find g m 1 m 2 . It is clear; if one solves the discrete logarithm problem, then the Diffie-Hellman problem is solved as well. The other direction is not known.
The most prolific cryptosystem in use today is the ElGamal cryptosystem. It uses the cyclic group G ¼ g hi . It is defined as follows:
The ElGamal cryptosystem
A cyclic group G ¼ g hi is public.
• Public-key: Let g and g m be public.
• Private-key: The integer m be private. 
The MOR cryptosystem
In the case of the MOR cryptosystem, one works with the automorphism group of a group. An automorphism group can be defined on any algebraic structure, and subsequently a MOR cryptosystem can also be defined on that automorphism group; however, in this chapter we restrict ourselves to finite groups. Furthermore, we look at classical groups defined by generators and automorphisms that are defined as actions on those generators.
Let G ¼ g 1 ; g 2 ; …; g s be a finite group. Let ϕ be a non-identity automorphism.
• Public-key:
be public.
• Private-key: The integer m is private.
Encryption:
To encrypt a plaintext M ∈ G, get an arbitrary integer r ∈ a: The number of generators. As we saw that the automorphism ϕ is presented as action on generators. Larger the number of generators, bigger is the size of the public key. b: Efficient algorithm to solve the word problem. This means that given G ¼ g 1 ; g 2 ; …; g s and g ∈ G, is there an efficient algorithm to write g as word in g 1 ,g 2 , …,g s ? The reason of this importance is immediate-the automorphisms are presented as action on generators, and if one has to compute ϕ g ðÞ , then the word problem must be solved.
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The obvious question is: what are the right groups for the MOR cryptosystem? In this chapter, we pursue a study of the MOR cryptosystem using finite Chevalley groups of classical type, in particular, orthogonal and symplectic groups.
Description of automorphisms of classical groups
This chapter studies the MOR cryptosystem for orthogonal and symplectic groups over a field of odd characteristics. As we discussed before, MOR cryptosystem is presented as action on generators of the group. Then to use an automorphism on an arbitrary element, one has to solve the word problem in that group with respect to that set of generators.
The generators and the Gaussian elimination algorithm to solve the word problem are described in Appendix A. We will be very brief here.
Let V be a vector space of dimension d over a field K of odd characteristic. Let β : V Â V ! K be a bilinear form. By fixing a basis of V, we can associate a matrix to β. We shall abuse the notation slightly and denote the matrix of the bilinear form by β itself. Thus β x; y ðÞ ¼ T xβy, where x, y are column vectors. We will work with non-degenerate bilinear forms and that means detβ 6 ¼ 0. A symmetric or skewsymmetric bilinear form β satisfies β¼ T β or β ¼À T β, respectively. We write the dimension of V as d ¼ 2l þ 1ord ¼ 2l for l ≥ 1. We fix a basis and index it by 0, 1, …,l, À 1, …, À l in the odd dimension, and in the case of even dimension where there are two non-degenerate symmetric bilinear forms up to equivalence, we index the bases by 1, 2, …,l, À 1, À 2, …, À l and 1, À 1, 2, …,l, À 2, …, À l for split and twisted forms, respectively. We consider the non-degenerate bilinear forms β on V given by the following matrices: a: The odd-orthogonal group. The form β is symmetric with d ¼ 2l þ 1 and
b: The symplectic group. The form β is skew-symmetric with d ¼ 2l and
c: The split orthogonal group. The form β is symmetric with d ¼ 2l and
The twisted orthogonal group. The form β is symmetric with d ¼ 2l and
where I l is the identity matrix of size l over K and for a fixed non-square ϵ ∈ K, 
and in the case of GO 2l; q ðÞ and GSp 2l; q ðÞ ,itis diag λ 1 ; …; λ l ; μλ
Conjugation by these diagonal elements produces diagonal automorphisms in the respective Chevalley groups. To build a MOR cryptosystem, we need to work with the automorphism group of Chevalley groups. In this section we describe the automorphism group of classical groups following Dieudonne [14] .
Conjugation automorphisms:IfN is a normal subgroup of a group G, then the conjugation maps n↦gng À1 for n ∈ N and g ∈ G are called conjugation automorphisms of G. In particular, both inner automorphisms and diagonal automorphisms are examples of conjugation automorphisms.
Central automorphisms: Let χ : G ! Z G ðÞ be a homomorphism to the center of the group. Then the map g↦χ g ðÞ g is an automorphism of G, known as the central automorphism. There are no nontrivial central automorphisms for perfect groups, for example, the Chevalley groups SL l þ 1; K ðÞ and Sp 2l; K ðÞ , |K|≥4, and l ≥ 2. In the case of orthogonal group, the center is of two elements I; ÀI fg , where I is the identity matrix. This implies that there are at most four central automorphisms in this case.
Field automorphisms: Let f ∈ Aut K ðÞ . In terms of matrices, field automorphisms amount to replacing each term of the matrix by its image under f. In all cases θ denotes a field automorphism. For a proof of the above theorem, see [26] , Theorems 30 and 36. In the above theorem, conjugation automorphisms are given by conjugation by elements of a larger group, and it includes the group of inner automorphisms. We introduce diagonal automorphisms to make it more precise. The conjugation automorphisms ι can be written as a product of ι g and η where ι g is an inner automorphism and η is a diagonal automorphism.
Diagonal automorphisms: In the definition of the conjugating automorphism, when the conjugating element is from the similitude group but not in the group we get a diagonal automorphism. In the case of special linear groups, diagonal automorphisms are given by conjugation by diagonal elements of PGL(l +1,q)on PGL(l +1,q). In the case of symplectic and orthogonal groups, diagonal automorphisms are given by conjugation by corresponding diagonal group elements defined in Definition 3.5.
Security of the proposed MOR cryptosystem
The purpose of this section is to show that for a secure MOR cryptosystem over the classical Chevalley and twisted orthogonal groups, we have to look at automorphisms that act by conjugation like the inner automorphisms. There are other automorphisms that also act by conjugation, like the diagonal automorphism and the graph automorphism for odd-order orthogonal groups. the hardness of our security assumptions. We denote the split orthogonal group by O þ 2l; q ðÞ and twisted orthogonal group by O À 2l; q ðÞ . Now onwards O(2l,q) means either split or twisted orthogonal group and we will specify whenever required.
Let ϕ be an automorphism of one of the classical Chevalley groups G:
ðÞ , Sp 2l; q ðÞ , or O 2l; q ðÞ . From Theorem 3.1, we know that ϕ ¼ c χ ιηγθ where c χ is a central automorphism, ι is an inner automorphism, η is a diagonal automorphism, γ is a graph automorphism, and θ is a field automorphism.
The group of central automorphisms are too small and the field automorphisms reduce to a discrete logarithm in the field F q . So there is no benefit of using these in a MOR cryptosystem. Also there are not many graph automorphisms in classical Chevalley and twisted orthogonal groups other than special linear groups and oddorder orthogonal groups. In the odd-order orthogonal groups, these automorphisms act by conjugation. Recall here that our automorphisms are presented as action on generators. It is clear ( [6] , Section 7) that if we can recover the conjugating matrix from the action on generators, the security is a discrete logarithm problem in F q d ,or else the security is a discrete logarithm problem in F q d 2 .
So from these we conclude that for a secure MOR cryptosystem, we must look at automorphisms that act by conjugation, like the inner automorphisms. Inner automorphisms form a normal subgroup of Aut G ðÞ and usually constitute the bulk of automorphisms. If ϕ is an inner automorphism, say ι g : x↦gxg À1 , we would like to determine the conjugating element g. For the special linear group, it was done in [6] . We will follow the steps there for the present situation too. However, before we do that, let us digress briefly to observe that G ! Inn G ðÞ given by g↦ι g is a surjective group homomorphism. Thus if G is generated by
This implies that our problem is equivalent to solving the word problem in Inn G ðÞ . Note that solving word problem depends on how the group is presented and it is not invariant under group homomorphisms. Thus the algorithm described earlier to solve the word problem in the classical Chevalley and twisted orthogonal groups does not help us in the present case.
In what follows, we will use generators x r t ðÞ , where r ¼ i; j ðÞ ; i 6 ¼ j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d for the special linear group. For symplectic group r ¼ i; j ðÞ ; i, j ∈ AE1; AE2; …; AEl fg . For the even-orthogonal group, r ¼ i; j ðÞ ; i, j ∈ AE1; AE2; …; AEl fg ; AE i 6 ¼AEj. For the oddorthogonal group r ¼ i; j ðÞ ; À l ≤ i ≤ l and j ∈ AE1; AE2; … AE l fg ; AE i 6 ¼AEj. These are the Chevalley generators for the Chevalley groups we are dealing with and are described in details in Tables A1, A5 , A3, and A7 in the Appendix.
Reduction of security
In this subsection, we show that for special linear and symplectic groups, the security of the MOR cryptosystem is the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in F q d . This is the same as saying that we can find the conjugating matrix up to a scalar multiple. We further show that the method that works for special linear and symplectic groups does not work for orthogonal groups.
Let ϕ be an automorphism that works by conjugation, i.e., ϕ ¼ ι g , for some g, and we try to determine g.
Step 1: The automorphism ϕ is presented as action on generators x r t ðÞ . Thus ϕ x r t ðÞ ðÞ ¼ gIþ te r ðÞ g À1 ¼ I þ tge r g À1 . This implies that we know ge r g À1 for all possible r. We first claim that we can determine N = gD where D is sparse, in fact, diagonal in the case of special linear and symplectic groups.
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In the case of special linear groups, write , and then we can recover m by solving the discrete logarithm in the matrices using Menezes and Wu's idea [15] . However, if we choose g such that g qÀ1 ¼ 1, then it seems that we might avoid this line of attack. We can bypass this argument by recovering the scalars a and b, and then to determine m, we compute the discrete logarithm in g hi using Menezes and Wu's idea. We prove the following proposition. However, in the case of orthogonal groups, we show that one cannot recover g up to a diagonal matrix using the above approach, and hence the above reduction attack does not work. 
This conclusively proves that the attack on the special linear groups and symplectic groups will not work for most orthogonal groups.
For orthogonal groups, the best we can do is the following: We can construct N such that N ¼ gD 1 þ PD 2 ðÞ , where D 1 and D 2 are diagonal and P is a permutation matrix. We demonstrate the construction of N in the case of a split orthogonal group O þ 2l; q ðÞ ; similar construction works for other cases as well. Computing ge r g À1 gives the following equations:
where G i is at jth place and G Àj is at Ài th place. This gives us a linear combination of the columns G i and G Àj .
G
where G i is at Àj th place and G j is at Ài th place. This will give us a linear combination of the columns G i and G j .
, where G Ài is at jth place and G Àj is at ith place. This will give us a linear combination of the columns G Ài and G Àj .
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We construct a matrix N as follows: 
ðÞ , where D 1 and D 2 are diagonal and P is a permutation matrix. This is not a diagonal matrix. One can do a similar computation for the odd-orthogonal group and twisted orthogonal group as well. In the special linear groups, the generators are the elementary transvections of the form I þ te i, j where i 6 ¼ j and t ∈ F q . Then the attack goes on smoothly as we saw earlier. However, when we look at generators of the form I þ te i, j À te Àj, Ài , where t ∈ F q and i 6 ¼ j, conjugating by them, it gets us a linear sum of the ith and jth column, not scalar multiple of one particular column. This stops the attack from going forward. However in the symplectic groups, there are generators of the form I þ e i, Ài and I þ e Ài, i for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. These generators make the attack possible for the symplectic groups. However there are no such generators for orthogonal groups, and so this attack turns out to be impossible for orthogonal groups.
The case for two-generators and prime fields
One serious objection against a MOR cryptosystem is the size of the key ( [10] , Section 7). The reason is that in a MOR cryptosystem, the automorphisms are presented as action on generators. Now the bigger the number of generators, the larger the key-size.
On the other hand, many of the finite simple groups can be generated by two elements. However, a set of generators is not enough. We must be able to compute the image of an arbitrary element. When the automorphism is presented as action on generators, we need an efficient solution to the word problem in order to do that. We have demonstrated in Appendix A that there is one set of generators, the elementary matrices, for which the word problem is easy.
The theme of this section is that for symplectic and even-order split orthogonal groups, there are two generators and for the odd-orthogonal group there are three generators. Over the prime field of odd characteristic, one can easily compute the word corresponding to the elementary matrices for these generators.
So one can present the automorphisms ϕ and ϕ m as action on these few generators and then compute the action of these automorphisms on the elementary matrices later. This substantially reduces the key-size. To do this we use the technique of straight line programs, which is popular in computational group theory. These are programs, but in practice are actually easy to use formulas. Say, for example, we want to compute x i, j t ðÞfor some t ∈ F q . We have loaded matrices the memory in such a way that this formula takes as input t and put it in the (1, 2) position of the matrix x 1, 2 Á ðÞand do the matrix multiplication. This is one straight line program. Since these programs are loaded in the memory, computation is much faster. This is somewhat similar to a time-memory trade-off. We have built a series of these straight line programs, where one straight line program can use other straight line programs and have written down the length of these programs. The length is nothing but the number of matrices in the formula.
Using the symplectic group in the MOR cryptosystem is straightforward. However, using orthogonal groups is little tricky because of the presence of λ in the output of the Gaussian elimination algorithm (see Section A.2.3). It is well known that the elementary matrices, without w i -the row interchanges matrices and generates Ω, the commutator subgroup of a orthogonal group. However in between the commutator and the whole group, there is another important subgroup, WΩ ¼ Ω; w i hi for some i. From the algorithmic point of view, it is the subgroup of all the matrices for which the λ is a square. Now once the λ is a square and we can efficiently compute the square root, we can write this matrix down as product of elementary matrices, and it is easy to implement in the MOR cryptosystem. It is well known that if p 3 mod4
ðÞ , then it is easy to compute the square root. Only for this reason, in the latter part of this section and for orthogonal groups, we concentrate on p 3 mod4 ðÞ .
Symplectic group Sp (2l, p)
Let p be an odd prime. It is known [16] that the group Sp(2l,p) is generated by two elements:
w ¼ 01
We will refer these two elements as Steinberg generators. However in the context of the MOR cryptosystem, we need to know how to go back and forth between these two generating sets-Steinberg generators and elementary matrices (see Table A3 ). To write w as a product of elementary matrices is easy, just put this generator through our Gaussian elimination algorithm. Here we demonstrate the other way round, that is, how to write elementary matrices as a product of x and w. In what follows, we denote the length of SLPs by L δ; i ðÞ , where δ ¼ j À i and
Here 
Hence we generate all the elementary matrices (Table A3) using only two generators x and w. Hence Sp(2l, p) is generated by only two generators x and w.
Split orthogonal group O + (2l, p)
Let p 3 mod4 ðÞ be a prime. It is known [16] that the group O + (2l,p) is generated by two elements:
We will refer these two elements as Steinberg generators. As we discussed earlier, in context of the MOR cryptosystem, we need to know how to go back and forth between these two generating sets-Steinberg generators and elementary matrices (Table A1) . To write w as a product of elementary matrices is easy, just put this generator through our Gaussian elimination algorithm. Here we demonstrate the other way round, that is, how to write elementary matrices as a product of x and w. In what follows, we denote the length of SLPs by L δ; i ðÞ , where δ ¼ j À i and 1 ≤ i , j ≤ l. 2l À 1 Hence we generate WΩ 2l; p ðÞ using only two generators x and w.
The MOR Cryptosystem in Classical Groups with a Gaussian Elimination
x 1, Ài tðÞ2 ≤ i ≤ l À 1 x i, l t ðÞ ; x 1, Àl 1 ðÞ ½2 LlÀ i; i ðÞ þ 2l À 1ðÞx i, Àj tðÞ2 ≤ i ≤ l À 1 i þ 1 ≤ j ≤ lðÞ
Orthogonal group O(2l+1, p)
Let p 3 mod4 ðÞ be a prime. It is known [16] that the group O(2l+1, p)is generated by these elements:
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We will refer these three elements as Steinberg generators. However in context of the MOR cryptosystem, we need to know how to go back and forth between these two generating sets-Steinberg generators and elementary matrices ( Table A5 ). To write w as a product of elementary matrices is easy, just put this generator through our Gaussian elimination algorithm. Here we demonstrate the other way round, that is, how to write elementary matrices as a product of w and x. 6l þ 6 In the context of MOR cryptosystem, we need to know how to go back and forth between these generators and elementary matrices ( 
ðÞ , so length of this SLP is L δ; i ðÞ þ 2 l À 1 ðÞ . Hence, we get all x i, j t ðÞfor 2 ≤ i 6 ¼ j ≤ l and the number of SLPs is l þ 2. Next, we compute the remaining elementary matrices using the commutator formula and are listed in the table; let r ¼ l À 1.
Elements
Indices Equation (SLP) Length 
Conclusion
This section is similar to ([6] , Section 8). A useful public-key cryptosystem is a delicate dance between speed and the security. So one must talk about speed along with security.
The implementation of the MOR cryptosystem that we have in mind uses the row-column operations. Let g 1 ; g 2 ; …; g s be a set of generators for the orthogonal or symplectic group as described before. As is the custom with a MOR cryptosystem, the automorphisms ϕ and ϕ m are presented as action on generators, i.e., we have ϕ g i ÀÁ and ϕ m g i ÀÁ as matrices for i ¼ 1, 2, …,s. To encrypt a message in this MOR cryptosystem, we compute ϕ r . We do that by square-and-multiply algorithm. For this implementation, squaring and multiplying is almost the same. So we will refer to both squaring and multiplication as multiplication. Note that multiplication is composed of automorphisms.
The implementation that we describe in this chapter can work in parallel. Each instance computes ϕ r g i ÀÁ for i ¼ 1, 2, …,s. First thing that we do is write the matrix of ϕ g i ÀÁ as a word in generators. So essentially the map ϕ becomes a map g i ↦w i where w i is a word in generators of some fixed length. Then multiplication becomes essentially a replacement, replace all instances of g i by w i . This can be done very fast. However, the length of the replaced word can become very large. The obvious question is how soon are we going to write this word as a matrix. This is a difficult question to answer at this stage and depends on available computational resources.
Once we decide how often we change back to matrices, how are we going to change back to matrices? There can be a fairly easy time-memory trade-offs. Write all words up to a fixed length and the corresponding matrix as a pre-computed table and use this table to compute the matrices. Once we have matrices, we can multiply them together to generate the final output. There are also many obvious relations among the generators of these groups. One can just store and use them. The best strategy for an efficient implementation is yet to be determined. It is clear now that there are many interesting and novel choices.
The benefits of this MOR cryptosystem are: This can be implemented in parallel easily. This implementation does not depend on the size of the characteristic of the field. This is an important property in light of Joux's recent improvement of the index-calculus attacks [11] .
For parameters and complexity analysis of this cryptosystem, we refer to ( [6] , Section 8). Assume that we take a prime of size 2 160 and we are using two generators presentation of ϕ for the even-orthogonal group. Then the security is the discrete logarithm problem in F p d 2 . Now if we take d ¼ 4, then the security is better than F 2 2560 . Our key-size is about 8000 bits. Comparing with Monico ([10] , Section 7), where he says an ElGamal will have about 6080 bits, our system is quite comparable. Moreover, the MOR cryptosystem is better suited to handle large primes and can be easily parallelized.
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Appendix A. Solving the word problem in G In computational group theory, one is always looking for algorithms that solve the word problem. When G is a special linear group, one has a well-known algorithm to solve the word problem-the Gaussian elimination algorithm. One observes that the effect of multiplying an element of the special linear group by an elementary matrix (also known as elementary transvection) from left or right is either a row or a column operation, respectively. Using this algorithm one can start with any matrix g ∈ SL l þ 1; k ðÞ and get to the identity matrix, thus writing g as a product of elementary matrices ( [18] , Proposition 6.2). One of the objective of this appendix is to discuss a similar algorithm for orthogonal and symplectic groups, with a set of generators that we will call elementary matrices in their respective groups. Similar algorithms can be found in the works of Brooksbank [19, 20] and Costi [21] . However, we have no restrictions on the cardinality or characteristic of the field k.
We first describe the elementary matrices and the row-column operations for the respective groups. These row-column operations are nothing but multiplication by elementary matrices from left and right, respectively. Here elementary matrices used are nothing but Chevalley generators which follows from the theory of Chevalley groups.
The basic idea of the algorithm is to use the fact that multiplying any orthogonal matrix by any one of the generators enables us to perform row or column operations. The relation T gβg ¼ β gives us some compact relations among the blocks of g which can be used to make the algorithm faster. To make the algorithm simple, we will write the algorithm for O 2l þ 1; k ðÞ ,O þ 2l; k ðÞ , and O À 2l; k ðÞ separately.
A.1 Groups in which Gaussian elimination works
• Symplectic groups: Since all non-degenerate skew-symmetric bilinear forms are equivalent ( [22] , Corollary 2.12), we have a Gaussian elimination algorithm for all symplectic groups over an arbitrary field.
• Orthogonal groups:
• Since non-degenerate symmetric bilinear forms over a finite field of odd characteristics are classified ( [22] , p. 79) according to the β (see Section 3), we have a Gaussian elimination algorithm for all orthogonal groups over a finite field of odd characteristics.
• algorithm for all orthogonal groups over a perfect field of even characteristics.
• Furthermore, we have Gaussian elimination algorithm for orthogonal groups that are given by the above bilinear forms or quadratic forms over arbitrary fields. This algorithm also works for bilinear or quadratic forms that are equivalent to the above forms.
A.2 Gaussian elimination for matrices of even size-orthogonal group O þ d; k ðÞ and symplectic group
Recall that the bilinear forms β are the following:
• T AC is symmetric. The working principle of our algorithm is simpleuse the symmetry of T AC. The problem is, for arbitrary A and C, it is not easy to use this symmetry. In our case we were able to reduce A to a diagonal matrix, and then it is relatively straightforward to use this symmetry. We will explain the algorithm in details later. First of all, let us describe the elementary matrices and the rowcolumn operations for orthogonal and symplectic groups. The genesis of these elementary matrices lies in the Chevalley basis of simple Lie algebras. We will not go into details of Chevalley's theory in this appendix. Furthermore, we do not need to, the algorithm that we produce will show that these elementary matrices are generators for the respective groups.
Next we present the elementary matrices for the respective groups and then the row-column operations in a tabular form. 
A.2.2 Elementary matrices (Chevalley generators) for symplectic group
For t ∈ k, the elementary matrices are defined as follows (Table A3) : Let us note the effect of multiplying g by elementary matrices. We write g ∈ Sp 2l; k ðÞ as g ¼ AB CD , where A, B, C, and D are l Â l matrices (Table A4) .
A.2.3 Gaussian elimination for Sp 2l; k ðÞ and O þ 2l; k ðÞ
Step 1: Use ER1 and EC1 to make A into a diagonal matrix. This makes A into a diagonal matrix and changes other matrices A, B, C, and D. For the sake of notational convenience, we keep calling these changed matrices as A, B, C, and D as well. Step 2: There are two possibilities. One, the diagonal matrix A is of full rank, and two, the diagonal matrix A is of rank r less than l. This is clearly identifiable by looking for zeros in the diagonal of A.
Step 3: Make r rows of C, corresponding to the non-zero entries in the diagonal of A zero by using ER3. If r ¼ l, we have C as zero matrix. If not let us assume that ith row is zero in A. Then we interchange the i th row with the Ài th row in g. We do this for all zero rows in A. The new C is a zero matrix. We claim that the new A must have a full rank. This follows from Equation A.1; in particular T CBþ T AD ¼ I l .IfC is zero matrix, then A is invertible. Now make A a diagonal matrix by using Step 1. Then one can make A a matrix of the form diag 1; …; 1; λ ðÞ , where λ ∈ k Â using ER1 ( [18] , Proposition 6.2). Once A is diagonal and C a zero matrix, the equation T CBþ T AD ¼ I l makes D a diagonal matrix of full rank.
Step 4: Use ER2 to make B a zero matrix. The matrix g becomes a diagonal matrix of the form diag 1; …; 1; λ; 1; …; 1; λ
À1

ÀÁ
, where λ ∈ k Â .
Step 5: (Only for symplectic groups) Reduce the λ to 1 using Lemma A.1. A.3 Gaussian elimination for matrices of odd size-the odd-orthogonal group
In this case, matrices are of odd size and there is only one family of group to consider; it is the odd-orthogonal group O 2l þ 1; k ðÞ . This group will be referred to as the odd-orthogonal group.
A.3.1 Elementary matrices (Chevalley generators) for
Following the theory of Lie algebra, we index rows by 0, 1, …,l, À 1, …, À l. These elementary matrices are listed in Table A5 .
Elementary matrices for the odd-orthogonal group in even characteristics differ from that of odd characteristics. In above table we made that distinction and listed them separately in different rows according to the characteristics of k. If char(k)is even, we can construct the elements w i , which interchanges the ith row with Ài th row as follows:
Otherwise, we can construct w i , which interchanges the ith row with Ài th row with a sign change in i th , À i th and 0 th row in odd-orthogonal group as follows: The Gaussian elimination algorithm for O 2l þ 1; k ðÞ follows the earlier algorithm for symplectic and even-orthogonal group closely, except that we need to take care of the zero row and the zero column. We write an element g ∈ O 2l þ 1; k 
Let us note the effect of multiplying g by elementary matrices (Table A6) . 
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Step 1: Use ER1 and EC1 to make A into a diagonal matrix, but in the process, it changes other matrices A, B, C, D, E, F, X, and Y. For the sake of notational convenience, we keep calling these changed matrices as A, B, C, D, E, F, X, and Y as well.
Step 2: Now there will be two cases depending on the rank r of matrix A. The rank of A can be easily determined using the number of non-zero diagonal entries. Use ER3 and non-zero diagonal entries of A to make corresponding r rows of C zero.
1. If r ¼ l then C becomes zero matrix.
2. If r , l then interchange all zero rows of A with corresponding rows of C using w i so that the new C becomes a zero matrix.
Once C becomes zero, note that Relation A.2 if char(k) is odd or Relation Qgv ðÞ ðÞ ¼ Qv ðÞif char(k) is even guarantees that X becomes zero. Relation A.5 guarantees that A has full rank l which also makes D a diagonal with full rank l. Thus Relation A.3 shows that F becomes zero as well. Then use Step 1 to reduce A ¼ diag 1; …; 1; λ ðÞ , where λ ∈ k Â .
Step 3: Now if char(k) is even, then Relation A.4 guarantees that E becomes zero as well. If char(k) is odd, then use ER4 to make E a zero matrix. Thus the matrix g reduces to diag AE1; 1; …; λ; 1; …; λ ðÞ , where λ ∈ k Â .
Remark A. 
A.4 Gaussian elimination in twisted orthogonal groups
In this section we present a Gaussian elimination algorithm for twisted orthogonal groups. The size of the matrix is even; the bilinear form used is c 0 from Section 3.
A.4.1 Elementary matrices (Chevalley generators) for twisted orthogonal groups O À 2l; k ðÞ
In this section, we describe row-column operations for twisted Chevalley groups. These groups are also known as the Steinberg groups. An element g ∈ O À 2l; k ðÞ is denoted as g ¼ 
